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Poland recovered its independence in 1918 and the building of education and science 
became one of the main tasks of new Polish state. Due to partition of the country into three 
zones, Russian, German (formerly, Prussian) and Austro-Hungarian (formerly, Austrian) 
a the end of 18th century, it was a very challenging aim. The policy of particular states 
occupying Poland toward cultural ambitions of Poles was different. Restricting attention to 
the period after 1864, relatively best situation occurred in Galicia, that is, Polish territory 
belonging to the Habsburg empire. A considerable liberalization of Austro-Hungary in the 
1870s resulted in a partial autonomy of Galicia and considerable freedom in cultivating 
Polish culture. As far as the issue concerns science and higher education, Galicia had two 
universities and the Polytechnic School.The Jagiellonian University in Kraków continued 
its character as fully Polish university after a short period (after 1849) in which German 
language served as official teaching. The University of Lvov became polonized around 
1870; the same concerns the Lvov Polytechnic School. Academy of Arts and Sciences 
was established in Kraków in 1872. These institutions managed normal scientific and/or 
educational activities in Polish intellectual circles.
The situation in the Russian zone was complex and essentially dependent on the 
actual policy of Tsarist authorities, which was sometimes relatively liberal or sometimes 
took a completely opposite course. In 1862, the Main School, practically a university 
was established in Warsaw. However, it was closed in 1869 and replaced by the Imperial 
University with Russian as the official language. On the other hand, Poles developed 
in the Russian zone, mostly in Warsaw, a half-official, but principally tolerated by Russians, 
system of education, which played an important role. In 1907, the authorities agreed for 
the rise of the Warsaw Scientific Society. The Mianowski Kasa, the Foundation for Supporting 
Polish Science, established in 1881, was another significant institution. The worst situation 
occurred in the German zone. The policy of Germanization, called Kulturkampf, was 
consequently executed by German authorities. To exclude Polish scientific and educational 
life (on higher level than secondary school) was one of the principles of Kulturkampf. 
The Poznań Society of the Friends of Science existed since 1857, but its real role was not 
particularly great. Although both Galician universities attracted many students from German 
and Russian zones, many Poles decided to study abroad, mostly in Germany, Austria, 
Russia or France.
The above (very) brief historical account explains why the unification of Polish 
educational system linked with creation of new universities became one of priorities 
after 1918. In the years 1915–1920, four universities (I omit other types of high schools 
– note that the term “high school” refers, according to Polish tradition, to any school at 
the university level) were established or renewed, namely in Warszawa (renewed), Poznań 
(new), Vilna (renewed) and Lublin (new; it was a catholic university and it did not play 
any role in exact sciences). In 1916, the Mianowski Kasa invited leading Polish scientists 
working in Poland and abroad to answer the question “What should be done in independent 
Poland in order to develop national science?” The very numerous answers outlined the 
state of art and needs of Polish science. This material was included in the two first volumes 
of the journal “Nauka Polska. Jej potrzeby, organizacja i rozwój” (Polish Science. Its 
Needs, Organization and Development)), published in 1918‒1919 (presumably, it was the 
first professional journal devoted to the science of science). This enterprise shows that 
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the building the foundations of science in Poland was considered very seriously by Polish 
scholars. Zygmunt Janiszewski’s famous programmatic essay on the needs of mathematics 
in Poland was one of papers published in this volume.
Speaking about remarkable development of mathematics and logic in Poland 
in 1918‒1939, one should not ignore Polish (or Warsaw) positivism. This movement, 
influenced by French and English positivism, was closely connected with the mentioned 
Main School. Polish positivism was a reaction to romanticism and its unsuccessful attempts to 
recover Polish independence by military fighting, directed mostly against Russia considered 
in Poland as the main invader. Two uprisings, namely in 1830‒1931 (the November 
Uprising) and in 1963‒1964 (the January Uprising) ended with total defeats as well as with 
subsequent political and cultural repressions. Polish positivists proposed another solution, 
namely so-called organic (or basic) work consisting in improving society (particularly, its 
lower classes) by increasing its economic prosperity and education. This second point was 
especially important for the rise of interests in the philosophy of science in Poland. Since 
Polish tradition was not very strong in this field, many translations of works of foreign 
leading philosophers and scientists appeared in 1865‒1918. The Mianowski Kasa was very 
instrumental in this enterprise. Books and papers on the foundations of exact sciences written 
by Dedekind, Enriques, Helmholtz, Jevons, Maxwell, Mill, Bain, Poincaré, Riemann, Pieri, 
Russell, Young and Whitehead were published in Polish. They allowed Polish intellectuals 
to follow the world development of science and its methodology. In this environment, first 
Polish scientists, like mathematicians Samuel Dickstein, Władysław Gosiewski and Edward 
Stamm (he was also a philosopher) began their activity as professional scholars.
Looking at the academic level, the philosophy of exact sciences in the interwar period 
did not start from the scratch around 1918. In Lvov, Kazimierz Twardowski, professor 
of philosophy since 1895, created a very good atmosphere for the development of logic. 
His metaphilosophical program of scientific philosophy, insisting on clarity of thinking 
and expressing thoughts in a language, demanding that philosophers should correctly 
justify the proposed statements and opposing metaphysical speculations, considered logic as 
a natural instrument of achieving cognitive goals. Twardowski did not work in logic, except 
a very few contributions to general logic, mostly semantics and the methodology of sciences. 
However, he recommended mathematical logic s worthy to a serious study to his students. 
Alfred Tarski summarized the role of Twardowski in the development of logic in Poland 
in the following words [18, p. 20].
Almost all researchers, who pursue the philosophy of exact sciences in Poland, are 
indirectly or directly the disciples of Twardowski, although his own works could be hardly 
be counted within this domain.
Twardowski trained a number of students who began to work in formal logic and the 
methology of sciences. This group included Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, 
Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Zygmunt Zawirski. 
The mentioned scholars formed the first generation of the so-called Lvov‒Warsaw School, 
a powerful group of analytic philosophy (in fact, it functioned as the Lvov School until 1915). 
Logic and the foundations of mathematics became popular among Lvov mathematicians 
still before 1914. Wacław Sierpiński lectured on set theory at the end of the first decade pf 
the 20th century. He was joined by Zygmunt Janiszewski. Both, Sierpiński and Janiszewski, 
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decided to devote their habilitation lectures to the problems of foundations of mathematics 
(the former spoke about the concept of mathematical correspondence and the latter – 
about realism and idealism in mathematics). However, Krakow, not Lvov, became the 
first serious centre of mathematical logic in Poland. Stanisław Zaremba a distinguished 
Polish mathematician, had strong interests in logic and the foundations of mathematics. He 
considered logic as a peripheral branch of mathematics, having only a secondary importance, 
mainly in teaching mathematicians. He was influenced in this attitude by the French style 
of doing mathematics. Zaremba’s views prevailed among mathematicians in Krakow. It is 
interesting that the Jagiellonian University had a special professorship in mathematical logic, 
occupied by Jan Śleszyński. Other logicians working in Krakow included Leon Chwistek 
and Witold Wilkosz. Warszawa appeared on the stage of logic in 1915, when German 
authorities (the city was occupied by Germans since the summer end of 1915) allowed to 
re-open the (Polish) university. Łukasiewicz was appointed as the professor of philosophy 
and began systematic lectures in logic and the foundations of mathematics which attracted 
many young mathematicians. He was joined by Leśniewski, who became the professor 
of the philosophy of mathematics in 1919. Also Kotarbiński moved to Warsaw as professor 
of philosophy in 1918.
According to the mentioned Janiszewski program, Polish mathematicians should 
concentrate on carefully chosen mathematical fields which could be promising from 
the point of view achieving new results. Set theory, topology and their applications to classical 
mathematics were identified as such domains. This choice made mathematical logic and the 
foundations of mathematics as located in the very centre of mathematics. Janiszewski also 
postulated that Poland should have a special mathematical journal published in international 
languages. This idea found its realization in Fundamenta Mathematicae (the first volume 
appeared in 1920). The first idea of Fundamenta Mathematicae particularly stressed 
the significance of logic and the foundations of mathematics by projecting two series 
of the journal, namely one devoted to set theory, topology and their applications, and second 
to logic and the foundations. However, this idea was abandoned and the Fundamenta was 
published as the unified journal, but with a considerable amount of papers on foundational 
problems. Lvov became the second main centre of Polish mathematical school. Krakow 
remained more traditional in the spirit of Zaremba. Sierpiński, Janiszewski and Stefan 
Mazurkiewicz (all move to Warsaw after 1918) played the main role in Warszawa, 
while Stefan Banach and Hugo Steinhaus became the leaders in Lvov. Yet one important 
difference between the two centres of modern mathematics in Poland must be noted. 
Although mathematicians in Lvov worked mainly on functional analysis, the operator theory 
and similar problems, eventually with using of set theory and topology, the mathematical 
circle in Warszawa focused more on abstract matters.
The University of Warsaw organized the separate Faculty of Mathematics and Natural 
Sciences. Łukasiewicz and Leśniewski, two philosophers with rather a limited mathematical 
education were appointed as professors just at this specialized faculty. Incidentally, it was 
a brave sociological move, not practised in other countries. Łukasiewicz and Leśniewski, 
supported by leading mathematicians working at the Warsaw Univwersity, particularly 
Sierpiński, Stefan Mazurkiewicz and Kazimierz Kuratowski (Janiszewski prematurely died 
in 1920) began very intensive teaching in mathematical logic and very soon found many gifted 
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students. Due to these activities, the Warsaw School of Logic was established. It included such 
logicians like Tarski, Adolf Lindenbaum, Mordchaj Wajsberg, Moses Presburger, Stanisław 
Jaśkowski, Bolesław Sobociński, Jerzy Słupecki and Andrzej Mostowski. This school had 
two parents, mathematics and philosophy, more explicitly the Warsaw School of Logic can be 
regarded as a part of Polish Mathematical School and the group originated with Twardowski 
since 1895, extended to the Lvov-Warsaw School after 1918. Last but not least, Twardowski 
idea of the development of Polish philosophy and the Janiszewski program shared similar 
points. Both great organizers of Polish science were convinced that Polish scholars have 
to have a very close contacts with novelties and tendencies executed in leading scientific 
investigations. By a coincidence, mathematical logic became a common focus for Twardowski 
and Janiszewski. On the other hand, although we have no written historical evidence, it is 
quite possible that Twardowski, Sierpiński and Janiszewski discussed the organization of 
science in Poland after recovering independence and reached similar conclusions, also those 
articulated by Janiszewski in his program. To complete personal issues, Ajdukiewicz stayed 
in Lvov (with exception of the years 1926-1928, when he taught in Warszawa) and lectured 
on logic for philosophers and mathematicians; he was appointed as professor of philosophy. 
The University of Lvov established the chair for mathematical logic in 1928. Chwistek won 
the competition for this postand he created a small school working in logic.
The double, mathematical and philosophical genesis, of the Warsaw School of Logic, 
immediately provokes the question about the philosophy of exact sciences in this circle. 
A similar problem concerns the entire Polish Mathematical School. Due to the mentioned 
differences between Warsaw and Lvov mathematicians, the first group treated the 
foundational the the second. Mathematicians from Kraków are not counted among members 
of Polish Mathematical School. As I already noticed, Zaremba had strong interests in logic 
and the foundations of mathematics, but he considered logic as a fairly marginal branch 
of mathematics, having only a secondary and auxiliary importance as a preparation for doing 
hard mathematics. The already indicated French influence on Zaremba resulted in his even 
hostile attitude to logic, similar to Poincaré’s view. Zaremba’s opinions prevailed among 
mathematicians in Krakow. Śleszyński’s position was cancelled when he became retired. 
More importantly, there was a great controversy between Zaremba and Polish Mathematical 
School concerning the foundations of mathematics. Zaremba entirely rejected the view that 
set theory constitutes the fundament of mathematics. In fact, Wilkosz was the only exception 
and conducted investigations in abstract (or pure) set theory. Chwistek, as I already noticed, 
moved to Lvov. The above explanations justify the further schematization of my report 
about the philosophy of exact sciences in Poland in the period 1918‒1939. It is reasonable to 
concentrate on the Warsaw branch of Polish Mathematical School, particularly the Warsaw 
School of Logic and on Chwistek who developed own approach to logic and the foundations 
of mathematics.
It is convenient to start with Leśniewski and Chwistek. Both developed general schemes, 
grand logics, so to speak, for grounding logic and mathematics best on very explicit 
philosophical premises. Leśniewski proposed a comprehensive system consisting of three 
parts, protothetic (a generalized propositional calculus), ontology (a logic of terms) and 
mereology (the theory of parts and wholes). Two first parts constitute pure logic, but the 
third one, mereological theory of classes, functions as a substitute of set theory, although 
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Leśniewski himself considered mereology as a part of logic. Leśniewski hoped to base the 
entire mathematics on his system. Leśniewski’s formal systems are radically nominalistic 
(no abstract objects are admitted), fully formalized (he accepted so-called intuitionistic 
formalism consisting in the view that formal languages are always interpreted; note 
that this view has nothing in common with intuitionism as a program in the foundations 
of mathematics) and realistic (logic and mathematics describe reality; the term “ontology” 
was chosen by Leśniewski, because he considered the logic of terms as the general theory 
of objects. Chwistek began his logical investigations by attempts to improve Russell’s ramified 
theory of types. More specifically, Chwistek tried to combine Poincaré’s constructivism 
(predicativism) and Russell’s approach by eliminating the axiom of reducibility. As a result he 
obtained a version of the simple theory of types based on strong nominalistic presuppositions. 
However, limitations of this solution in capturing the entire mathematics by the modified 
simple theory of type pushed Chwistek to a different conception consisting in constructing 
the hierarchy of semantic systems. Semantics in Chwistek’s sense is a general formal theory 
of expressions, but not a theory of relations between languages and what they refer to. Thus, 
semantics is rather similar to syntax in it standard understanding. Chwistek in his new logical 
construction also preserved nominalism. The foundational proposals of Leśniewski and 
Chwistek, although different in essential points, can be considered as versions of logicism, 
that is, grounding mathematics as a part of logic, provided that mereology and semantics 
(in Chwistek’s sense) are considered as parts of logic. Both, Leśniewski and Chwistek took 
this position.
Chwistek and Leśniewski were exceptions in Poland, because other Polish 
logicians and mathematicians did not develop general conceptual schemes as capturing 
mathematics and mathematical knowledge. Consequently, the Polish Mathematical 
School and the Warsaw Logical School had no official philosophy of exact sciences. More 
specifically, Polish logicians and mathematicians did not ascribed themselves to one of 
the dominant foundational projects of the first half of the 20th century, namely logicism, 
formalism or intuitionism. Using a label, popular nowadays (see [7]) the philosophy of logic 
and mathematics was considered in Poland as the second philosophy, according to the slogan 
(it is a paraphrase of the saying beginning with primum vivere) primum mathematicari, 
deinde philosophari. Putting this otherwise, mathematical practise is first, but mathematical 
philosophy – the second one. This background allowed to employ simultaneously various 
influences stemming from reading books and papers written by foreign scholars and having 
personal contacts with them. Due to the fame of Principia Mathematica, Russell was 
extremely popular in Poland, but nobody, even Chwistek or Leśniewski, accepted logicism 
as the only correct foundational scheme. In fact, Łukasiewicz began his serious logical 
investigations after reading Russell’s, The Principles of Mathematics, pubhlished in 1903. 
Traces of formalism are clearly present in Chwistek, Ajdukiewicz, Leśniewski and Tarski; 
two first studied in Göttingen, but the rest knew formalism from the literature only. I already 
noticed, Poincaré’s influence on Chwistek, but the latter was inspired by constructivism 
(predicativism) of the former, but not by his conventionalism. It interesting that even 
in the case of Polish authors (Chwistek, Leśniewski) proposing own foundation al schemes, 
we easily recognize influences coming from different, often mutually rival, philosophical 
programs. Thus, pluralism as a general standpoint in the philosophy of logic and mathematics 
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can be regarded as one of the most characteristic features of the worldview of the Polish 
school of logic and mathematics. Incidentally, pluralism was also a characteristic view in the 
entire philosophical Lvov‒Warsaw School.
On the other hand, some Polish authors strongly influenced the rise of a quite new 
foundational paradigm. The programs of logicism, formalism and intuitionism were replaced 
in the 1930s by new projects, namely set theoretical, constructivism and proof-theoretical 
(see [10]). Due to the role of set theory in the reconstructing the whole edifice of classical 
mathematics, stressed by the Polish Mathematical School, it was quite natural that Polish 
mathematicians and logicians contributed to the set theoretical paradigm. Excluding 
set theory from logic, contrary to logicism, resulting in favouring first-order logic as the 
logic by most Polish logicians; higher-order logic was considered as a part of set theory. 
Although formalism did not attract Poles as a general foundational programs, several 
Tarski’s works on consequence operations and general deductive systems can be viewed 
as contributions to the proof-theoretical foundational scheme, although Tarski himself was 
never committed to the view that formalism is the best proposal in grounding the foundations 
of logic and mathematics. In fact, most Polish mathematicians and logicians abstain from 
explicit declarations what is the best in science.
The attitude of Polish logicians and mathematicians to intuitionism and constructivism 
as grand projects in the foundations of mathematics provides perhaps a particularly 
instructive illustration of Polish pluralism in doing the philosophy of logic and mathematics. 
As it is well-known, constructivism (intuitionism is its very radical version) considers non- 
-constructive mathematical methods as defective in a way which cannot be improved. This 
radical verdict also concerns infinitistic procedures exceeding those mathematical methods 
which can be formalized within arithmetic of natural numbers (in this respect, constructivism 
is somehow more liberal than Hilbert’s original formalism admitting finitely performable 
constructions as the only admissible methods in the so called real mathematics). Tarski 
[16, p. 713] said once:
“As an essential contribution of the Polish school to the development 
of metamathematics one can regard the fact that from the very beginning 
it admitted into metamathematical research all fruitful methods, whether 
finitary or not”.
The message coming from this fragment is a good example of application the dictum 
primum mathematicari, deinde philosophari. Tarski’s view can be characterized as 
methodological Platonism. Paradoxically, Tarski himself frequently expressed his sympathy 
to nominalism. However, if someone sharply distinguishes mathematics and its philosophical 
interpretations, such a discrepancy unnecessarily must be regarded as a lack of coherence.
Sierpiński commenting the axiom of choice, controversial as it is commonly admitted, 
applying the same ideology ([13, p. 95]; this opinion appeared in Sierpiński’s writings 
much earlier, in fact, since early 1920s) as Tarski did in the following words:
Still, apart from our personal inclinations to accept the axiom of choice, we 
must take into consideration, in any case, its role in the Set Theory and in the 
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Calculus. On the other hand, since the axiom of choice has been questioned 
by some mathematicians, it is important to know which theorems are poved 
with its aid, and to realize the exact point at which the proof been based on ther 
axiom of choice, for it has frequently happened that various authors have made 
use of the axiom of choice in their proofs without being aware of it. And after 
all, even if no one questioned the axiom of choice, it would bnot be without 
interest to investigate which proofs are based on it and which theorems are 
proved without its aid – this as we know , id also done with regard to other 
axioms.
This attitude produced the entire program of investigations concerning the status of the 
axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis in the entire body of mathematics. The deep 
results obtained by Polish mathematicians working on this issue (Sierpiński, Kuratowski, 
Tarski, Lindenbaum, Mostowski) belong to the most remarkable achievements of the Polish 
Mathematical School. They very essentially contributed to the development of the set- 
-theoretical project of the foundations of mathematics.
Although Polish logicians did not belong to the constructivism school in the foundations 
of mathematics, they worked on topics suggested by intuitionism. Let me mention 
resuts of Łukasiewicz (axiomatization of intuitionistic propositional calculus, investigations 
of relations between classical and intutionistic logic), Tarski (intuitionistic logic and 
topology), Wajsberg (the separation theorem for intutionistic propositional calculus) 
and Jaśkowski (the construction of adequate matrix for intuitionistic propositional calculus). 
Mostowski remarked [9, p. VII]:
“I am inclined to think that a satisfactory solution of the problem of the 
foundations of mathematics will follow the path pointed out by constructivism 
or in a direction close to it. However, it would be impossible to write a textbook 
of logic on this base at the moment”.
He preceded these words by remarking that a deeper discussion of the philosophical 
foundations of logic does not belong to the scope of formal logic.
Generally speaking, the principles of extensionality and compositionally were 
axiomatically adopted as regulative ideas governing logic. In propositional calculus, 
according to this principle, every operation must be extensional, that acting as a truth- 
-function of its constituents. Consequently, many-valued logic has to be equally extensional 
as classical (bivalent) logic. This view motivated Łukasiewicz to interpreted modalities 
within many-valued logic. The modal extensions of classical logic, like Lewis-style 
systems, were considered as somehow defective as not fully extensional. The principle 
of extensionality was extended to interpretations of quantifiers and semantic constructions. 
In particular, Tarski’s famous semantic definition of truth was extensional in this sense, 
that he defined the set of true sentences, not the intensional concept of truth. Of course, 
one can, and Tarski did that, consider the definition in question as explaining the meaning 
of the term “true’, but this move requires the assumption that extension and intension 
strictly coincide in this case.
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Polish logicians generally accepted realism as a view concerning the relation of logic 
and reality. Roughly speaking, logic was conceived as a description of reality. This view 
was, as I already noticed, advanced by Leśniewski, was also shared by Łukasiewicz in 
the interwar period (he took a more conventionalist position after 1945). However, both 
leaders of the Warsaw School of Logic had considerably different answers to the question 
which logic is correct. Leśniewski decisively preferred classical logic and considered many-
valued logics as formal algebraic constructions. On the contrary, Łukasiewicz maintained 
that one of the variety of rival systems is satisfied in the real world (he hoped that infinitely 
many-valued logic is correct). Tarski also preferred classical logic. He did not justify this 
view by ontological arguments, but appealed to simplicity, universality and productivity 
of rthe classical system. A consequence of realism (Tarski presumably shared this philosophy 
of logic) consisted in the rejection of the distinction between logical and extra-logical 
concepts as well as between logical and empirical, at least if both discriminations are taken as 
absolute. Tarski tried to explain the essence of logical notions by regarding them as invariant 
under all one-to-one transformations of the universe into itself. It was a generalization 
of the Erlangen program in the foundations geometry, proposed by Felix Klein.
Although Polish logicians had no official philosophy of logic, several important 
investigations were strongly motivated by philosophical considerations. Perhaps the most 
important examples of how philosophy influenced logic are provided by many-valued logic 
and the semantic definition of truth. Łukasiewicz’s main (initial, because he changed his 
mind later) motivation in proposing many-valued system of logic explicitly focused on 
attempts to reject determinism for its inconsistency with postulates of freedom, creativity 
and responsibility. Tarski in his semantic truth-definition explicitly followed Aristotle’s 
tradition seeing truth as saying as things are. On the other hand, one should definitely 
observe that motivation does not mean justification. In particular, Łukasiwicz regarded the 
principle of bivalence as metalogical, not purely logical and Tarski opted for the classical 
truth-definition for its intuitive plausibility and being subjected to a rigorous mathematical 
treatment. Consequently, we must try to justify bivalence or its denial by separate 
investigations, ontological or scientific, because pure logic is insufficient in this respect.
Finally, let me say something about the social significance of logic according to the Polish 
school. This goes back to Twardowski. He wrote [19, p. 71]:
“The lack of logical education not only decreases the intellectual level 
from the theoretical point of view, but also brings ignorance and obscurity in 
practical applications of our thoughts. And the whole our life is this practical 
application”.
Similar thoughts are to be found in Łukasiewicz [5, p. 615; 6, p. 5]:
“I believe that only just mathematical logic will teach us strict thinking. 
In my opinion, it is its greatest significance and task, even its social mission.
My entire scientific activity was guided by the remote thought that we will 
come at one time to more correct views about the world and life by improving 
logical thinking”.
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And Tarski said [15, p. XV]:
“I shall be happy if this book contributes to the wider diffusion of logical 
knowledge. The course of historical events has assembled in this country [USA 
– J.W.] the most eminent representatives of contemporary logic, and has thus 
created here especially favourable conditions for the development of logical 
thought. These favourable conditions can, of course, be easily overbalanced 
by other and more powerful factors. It is obvious that the future of logic, 
as well as of all theoretical science, depends essentially upon normalizing 
the political and social relations of mankind, and thus upon a factor which 
is beyond the control of professional scholars. I have no illusions that the 
development of logical thought, in particular, will have an essential effect 
upon the process of normalization of human relationships; but I believe that 
the wider diffusion of the knowledge of logic may contribute positively to the 
acceleration of this process. For, one the one hand, by making the meaning of 
concepts precise and uniform in its own field and by stressing the necessity 
of such a precision and uniformiazation in any other domain, logic leads to the 
possibility of better understanding between those who have the will to do so. 
And, on the other hand, by perfecting and sharpening the tools of thought, 
it makes men more critical – and thus makes less likely their being misled 
by all the pseudo-reasonings to which they are in various parts of the world 
incessantly exposed today”.
Perhaps we can sum up the last quotations by repeating Łukasiewicz’s and Tarski’s 
sayings (unpublished, but preserved in the oral Polish tradition): “Logic is morality of speech 
and thought”; “Religion (you can say “ideology”) divides people, logic brings them together”.
Bibliographical Appendix
For general accounts of Polish Mathematical School see [3, 4]. The Lvov branch 
of Polish Mathematical School is extensively presented in [2]. For account of the Lvov‒ 
‒Warsaw School, see [2, 14, 20]. The book [12] contains a detailed exposition of the 
philosophy of logic and mathematics in the interwar period as well as provides an extensive 
bibliography of sources.
R e f e r e n c e s
[1] Duda R., Pearls from the Lost City. The Lvov School of Mathematics, American Mathematical 
Society, Providence 2014.
[2] Jordan Z., The Development of Mathematical Logic and of Logical Positivism in Poland 
between Two Wars, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1945; partly reprinted in [8], 346-397.
[3] Kuratowski K., A Half-Century of Polish Mathematics, Pergamon Press, Oxford 1980.
[4] Kuzawa M. G., Modern mathematics. The Genesis of a School in Poland, College and University 
Press, New Haven, Conn. 1966.
265
[5] Łukasiewicz J., O znaczeniu i potrzebach logiki matematycznej w Polsce (On Role and Needs 
of Mathematical Logic in Poland), Nauka Polska, Vol. X, 1929, 604-620.
[6] Łukasiewicz J., Warszawska Szkoła Logiczna (The Warsaw School of Logic), Życie. Katolicki 
Tygodnik Religijno-Kulturalny, Vol. IX(43), 1955, 5.
[7] Maddy P., Second Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2007.
[8] MacColl S. (ed.), Polish Logic 1920‒1939, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1967.
[9] Mostowski A., Logica matematyczna (Mathematical Logic), Monografie Matematyczne, 
Warszawa 1948.
[10] Mostowski A., Thirty Years of Foundational Studies. Lectures on the Development 
of Mathematical Logic and the Study of the Foundations of mathematics in 1930‒1964, 
Societas Philosophica Fennica, Helsinki; reprinted in [11], Vol. 1, 1-176.
[11] Mostowski A., Foundational Studies, vls. 1‒2 , North-Holland, Amsterdam 1979.
[12] Murawski R., The Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic in the 1920s and 1930s in Poland, 
Birhäuser, Basel 2014.
[13] Sierpiński, W., Cardinal and Ordinal Numbers, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 
1965.
[14] Skolimowski H., Polish Analytical Philosophy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London Introduction 
to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1941.
[15] Tarski A. [Remarks of Alfred Tarski], Revue Internationale de Philosophie 27‒28, 18-19, 
repr. [17], Vol. 4, 713.
[16] Tarski A., Collected Papers, vls. 1‒4 , Birkhäuser, Basel 1986.
[17] Tarski A. [A Letter to Otto Neurath, 25 IV 1930], Grazer Philosophische Studien, vol. 43, 20-22.
[18] Twardowski K., O wykształcenie logiczne (On Logical Education), Ruch  Filozoficzny V, (4–5), 
1920, 65-71.
[19] Woleński, J. Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov–Warsaw School, Kluwer Publishing, Company, 
Dordrecht 1989.
